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I. INTRODUCTION
Legislative histories and case decisions related to federal intellectual property
(IP) law are teeming with pronouncement of the need for and value of
“uniformity,” particularly with respect to patent and copyright laws because
they are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal courts and because the
asserted value of uniformity lies at the very heart of the Intellectual Property
Clause of the U.S. Constitution.1 As explained by James Madison in The
Federalist No. 43, “the States cannot separately make effectual provision for
either [patents or copyrights].”2 Justice Story elaborated on this point in his
commentaries on the Constitution when he explained:
It is beneficial to all parties, that the national government should
possess this power; to authors and inventors, because, otherwise,
they would be subjected to the varying laws and systems of the
different states on this subject, which would impair, and might
even destroy the value of their rights; to the public, as it will
promote the progress of science and the useful arts, and admit
the people at large, after a short interval, to the full possession
and enjoyment of all writings and inventions without restraint.3
As so used, “uniformity” is short-hand for a single federal rule or standard
on a given issue of law (“federal uniformity”), as opposed to the way the term
was used in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins to refer to the same rules and standards
being applied regardless of whether a lawsuit is filed in state or federal court
within a state (“Erie uniformity”).4 The term “federal uniformity” is used
herein, instead of “national uniformity,” to refer to the uniformity that arises
from the enactment of federal laws as opposed to the uniformity that arises
from the adoption of uniform state laws.
In recent decades, the federal uniformity argument has been used to justify:
the creation of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals as the exclusive circuit

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 259 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 2003).
3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 502, at
402 (R. Rotunda & J. Nowak eds., 1987).
4 Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1938). See also Guaranty Trust Co. v. York,
326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (stating: “The nub of the policy that underlies [Erie] is that for the same
transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal court instead of in a State
court a block away, should not lead to a substantially different result.”).
1
2
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court to hear appeals of district court judgments in patent cases;5 vesting federal
judges with the job of interpreting patent claims;6 and Copyright term
extension.7 It was also a primary justification for the May 11, 2016 enactment
of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016.8 Indeed, it seems that the argument
surfaces anytime Congress wants to assert more of a role in dictating the details
of law and policy, despite the fact that it conflicts with the U.S. system of
federalism by favoring federal laws over state laws and federal uniformity over
Erie uniformity.
Contemporary scholars have identified a number of rationales for federal
uniformity, including: the need to maintain the legitimacy of the federal courts;
the unfairness of treating similarly situated litigants differently; the need for
predictability; and the inefficiency of making multi-state actors comply with
divergent legal standards.9 An underlying assumption of the federal uniformity
argument is that if Congress passes a federal law to govern a particular area of
law then the legal principles governing that law will be interpreted and applied
in a uniform manner, leading to greater predictability and efficiency. In areas
where state law can also govern (like trademark and trade secret law), it also
assumes that state law lacks sufficiently uniform rules and standards. In this
regard, “uniformity” is often used to mean “unified” or “same,” rather than
“harmonized” or “similar,”10 with an additional assumption being that
uniformity is preferred over harmonization.
As detailed in Part II of this Article, there are numerous reasons why the
ability of federal laws to unify legal principles is more myth than reality.11 Chief
among them is the United States system of federalism which, even with respect

5 H.R. REP. NO. 97–312, at 20 (1981). See also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A
Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989).
6 Markman v. Westview Instruments, 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (stating “we see the
importance of the uniformity in the treatment of a given patent as an independent reason to
allocate all issues of construction to the court”).
7 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 243 (2003) (Beyer, J., dissenting) (criticizing the uniformity
argument).
8 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 4 (2016).
9 Amanda Frost, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 VA. L. REV. 1567, 1596 Part I (2008).
10 See generally Camilla Baasch Andersen, Defining Uniformity in Law, 12 UNIF. L. REV. nn.5, 5–15
(2007) (exploring how the term “uniform” is used internationally, comparing it to the term
“harmonisation,” and noting that true uniformity is an absurdity).
11 The same observation has been made with respect to other areas of law seemingly reserved
to the federal government. See Robert Force, Deconstructing Jensen: Admiralty and Federalism in the
Twenty-First Century, 32 J. MAR. L. & COM. 517 (2001) (arguing for continued use of state laws in
some admiralty situations); Robert D. Peltz, The Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21 TUL. MAR.
L.J. 103 (1996) (lamenting the failure of the federal courts to insist on more uniformity).
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to federal laws, often requires federal courts to apply state law.12 There is also
the very practical problem that circuit splits cannot be resolved until a case is
presented before the U.S. Supreme Court and it decides to hear the issue.13
Even then, the decisions of the Supreme Court do not always provide enough
guidance to prevent further divergences in how the applicable federal law is
applied. One need only look at the jurisprudence under our existing federal
patent, copyright, and trademark laws to know that federal uniformity is a myth.
Each of these federal statutes have existed for decades, but circuit splits remain
on numerous important issues.14 This is not to suggest that federal laws are not
needed with respect to these matters, but rather, it suggests that when adopting
federal laws, we should not assume that federal uniformity will follow. Instead,
we should identify the specific issues upon which true uniformity is most
important and legislate more carefully with respect to them, leaving other issues
to, potentially, be non-uniform. More importantly, when adopting federal laws,
we should look for adequate justifications for the federal legislation beyond the
claimed need for uniformity. Otherwise, all we are doing is shifting law-making
power from the states to Congress and the federal courts.
This Article begins in Part I with examples of uniformity problems that have
arisen with respect to federal intellectual property (IP) laws. In Part II, it
categorizes the uniformity problems and in the process, demonstrates that a
lack of uniformity in law is not always the result of divergent views of states,
but can result from divergent views among federal judges or due to the facts of
See infra Part II.
Frost, supra note 9, at 1569 (noting that “seventy percent of [the Supreme] Court’s plenary
docket is devoted to addressing legal issues on which lower courts have differed, . . .”).
14 See, e.g., Michael Landau & Donald E. Biederman, The Case for a Specialized Copyright Court:
Eliminating the Jurisdictional Advantage, 21 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 717, 737–39 (1999) (decrying
the prevalence of circuit splits on copyright issues); Jennifer E. Rothman, Commercial Speech,
Commercial Use and the Intellectual Property Quagmire, 101 VA. L. REV. 1929, 1935–37 (2015) (discussing
the inconsistent application of First Amendment principles to trademark law). A recent crowdsourcing request of intellectual property (IP) scholars resulted in a long list of other IP issues upon
which there are circuit splits, or in the case of the Federal Circuit, internal circuit splits, including: the
meaning of the de minimis copyright defense related to music sampling (from David S. Levine); the
test for nominative fair use under trademark law and the free speech defense to rights of publicity
(from Mark Lemley); the test of unlawful appropriation under copyright law and whether “making
available” is a distribution under copyright law (from Yvette Liebesman); the useful article doctrine
of copyright law (from Margot Kaminski), although the Supreme Court recently opined on such
issue in Star Athletica v. Varsity Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1002 (2017); the test for substantial similarity under
copyright law and whether contracts are per se immune from copyright preemption (from Guy Rub);
the scope of the Rogers v. Grimaldi defense under rights of publicity law (from Bill McGeveran); the
scope of the famous mark exception in trademark law and the extraterritorial extent of the Lanham
Act (from Tim Holbrook); and the definition and application of transformativeness under copyright
law (from Shubha Ghosh and Ann Bartow).
12
13
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a particular case. Parts III and IV reflect upon the asserted benefits of
uniformity and how uniformity problems might be reduced through better
legislative processes and drafting. The Article concludes with the observation
that there may be times when a lack of uniformity is to be preferred over more
detailed or preemptive federal legislation.
II. IP UNIFORMITY PROBLEMS
One need look no further than the circumstances surrounding the creation
of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeal in 1982 to realize that federal uniformity
is often a myth. When the Federal Circuit was created, uniformity in the
interpretation and application of U.S. patent laws was its principal goal.15 But
that goal demonstrates the myth of uniformity of federal laws because, in
theory, having an “exclusive” federal patent law should have already resulted in
the desired federal uniformity because the potential for conflicts between state
laws and federal laws was eliminated. However, as David Taylor noted, another
justification for the creation of the Federal Circuit was concern that the U.S.
Supreme Court was not doing its job to resolve conflicts among federal circuit
courts.16 The proponents of the Federal Circuit also argued that the judges of
the existing circuit courts did not have enough scientific and patent law
expertise (or interest) to decide patent cases, and thus a specialized court of
patent law experts was needed.17 While the establishment of the Federal Circuit
has been credited with creating more uniformity in patent law,18 it is also
criticized for simply shifting the debates about the meaning and application of
patent law from a battle of circuit courts to battles between different panels of
the Federal Circuit and between the Federal Circuit and the U.S. Supreme

15 S. REP. NO. 97–275, at 4–6 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 11, 14–16 (“The creation of
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will produce desirable uniformity in this area of law.
Such uniformity will reduce the forum-shopping that is common to patent litigation”). See also S.
Jay Plager, The United States Courts of Appeals, the Federal Circuit, and the Non-Regional Subject Matter
Concept: Reflections on the Search for a Model, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 853, 854–55 (1990) (“The impetus
behind the establishment of the Federal Circuit was the desire to bring about greater uniformity
and coherency . . . .”).
16 David O. Taylor, Formalism and Antiformalism in Patent Law Adjudication: Rules and Standards, 46
CONN. L. REV. 415, 415 (2013).
17 Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1801
(2013).
18 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: The Federal Circuit Comes of Age,
23 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 787, 788–89 (2008).
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Court.19 Moreover, creation of the Federal Circuit did not resolve the lack of
uniformity that results from the highly fact-dependent application of patent law.
The experience of patent law before the creation of the Federal Circuit
demonstrates that just because a federal law is adopted does not mean it will be
interpreted and applied in accordance with uniform rules or standards.
However, before suggesting more specialized courts to increase uniformity in
IP law, the reasons for the lack of uniformity should be considered to determine
whether uniformity should or can ever be achieved.20 As is explored more fully
in Part II of this Article, there are reasons for a lack of federal uniformity that
have nothing to do with the structure of the federal courts and have a lot to do
with other principles of law, including federalism. The discussion that follows
gives an overview of some of the reasons based upon the U.S. Supreme Court’s
intellectual property jurisprudence.
A. LACK OF UNIFORMITY IN SUPREME COURT’S IP JURISPRUDENCE

Because the IP Clause of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress power to
adopt federal laws for the promotion of the arts and sciences, state power to
regulate in these areas would seem to be preempted or precluded, but this is not
the case. Even in cases of a strong Constitutional grant of federal power and a
comprehensive federal statute, like the Patent and Copyright Acts, the federal
judiciary is reluctant to supplant state law. Thus, absent an express preemption
provision, and despite differences of opinion concerning the ease with which
implied preemption may be found, federal courts often fail to find implied
preemption, or even the displacement, of state laws.21 Moreover, as Professor
Roderick Hills explained: “The concern for overextending the legitimacy of
federal courts has tempered the Court’s willingness to displace swathes of state
law with judicially crafted federal common law absent some sort of specific
congressional guidance.”22 Numerous cases in the area of IP law bear this
observation out.23
19 Taylor, supra note 16, at 456–58 (detailing the four cases where the U.S. Supreme Court
overturned decisions by the Federal Circuit). See also Plager, supra note 15, at 857 (analyzing the
emergence of intracircuit battles as opposed to intercircuit battles).
20 But see Landau & Biederman, supra note 14, at 718.
21 See generally Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National
Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2007) (explaining federal preemption jurisprudence and the
scholarly debate concerning the appropriate approach thereto).
22 Id. at 9.
23 See JEANNE C. FROMER, The Intellectual Property Clause’s Preemptive Effect, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW 265, 265 (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., Cambridge University
Press, 2013), for a more in-depth discussion of the Supreme Court’s preemption analysis in IP cases.
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For instance, in Goldstein v. California, the Supreme Court considered whether
a state law of California which made it a crime to transfer sounds from a sound
recording was unconstitutional on a variety of grounds, including the alleged
intention of Congress to establish a uniform law across the land.24 (At the time
the case was filed, federal copyright law did not provide protection for sound
recordings.) The Court could have made U.S. law with respect to creative works
more uniform by invalidating the California statute, but refused to do so,
holding that the IP Clause “neither explicitly precludes the States from granting
copyrights nor grants such authority exclusively to the Federal Government.”25
On the issue of preemption, the Court quoted Hines v. Davidowitz to explain:
“Our primary function is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this
particular case, [the state] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”26 Finding no such
obstacle, the Court held that the California statute was a proper exercise of
powers reserved to the states and that the law was not preempted by either the
1909 Copyright Act or the 1971 Sound Recording Act.27
The importance of the Goldstein Court’s ruling with respect to federal
uniformity (or lack thereof) is put into perspective by the dissents. Justice
Douglas argued that two earlier Supreme Court cases, Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co.28 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.,29
make clear that the federal policy expressed in [the IP Clause], is
to have “national uniformity in patent and copyright laws, . . ., a
policy bolstered by Acts of Congress which vest “exclusive
jurisdiction to hear patent and copyright cases in federal
courts . . . and that section of the Copyright Act which expressly
saves state protection of unpublished writings but does not
include published writings.”30
Consistent with Justice Story’s observations, supra, Justice Douglas’s plea for
federal uniformity was due, in large part, to a concern about monopoly power
and not wanting to give states the power to limit free competition and the
dissemination of information. In other words, he viewed the federal interest in
24
25
26
27
28
29
30

Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
Id. at 560.
See id. at 561 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
Id. at 571.
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
Id. at 234.
Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 573 (quoting Sears, Roebuck Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, n.7 (1964)).
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preventing monopolies and ensuring the free-flow of public information as
overriding the traditional deference to the states. Justice Marshall’s dissent
expanded upon this theme when he noted that: “Congress has decided that free
competition should be the general rule, until it is convinced that the failure to
provide copyright or patent protection is hindering ‘the Progress of Science and
useful Arts.’ ”31 However, the need for federal uniformity related to creative
works was rejected in Goldstein in favor of the local values that were expressed
in the California law.
Decisions by the Supreme Court since Goldstein reveal that, in the absence of
an express preemption provision, sometimes federal IP statutes preempt or
displace state law, and sometimes they do not. Whether such preemption is
found usually depends upon whether the challenged state law conflicts with the
underlying federal policy, not including an interest in federal uniformity. For
instance, in Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp.,32 the trade secret law of Ohio was not
preempted, but in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,33 Florida’s plugmolding statute was preempted. Underlying both decisions were principles of
federalism balanced against the strong U.S. policy that favors the use and
dissemination of publicly available information and the related disclosure
purpose of U.S. patent law. In finding no conflict that would justify
preemption of state trade secret law, the Court in Kewanee explained:
States may hold diverse viewpoints in protecting intellectual
property to invention as they do in protecting the intellectual
property relating to the subject matter of copyright. The only
limitation on the States is that in regulating the area of patents
and copyrights they do not conflict with the operation of the laws
in this area passed by Congress. . . .34
Similarly, although finding Florida’s statute preempted, Justice O’Connor
explained in Bonito Boats:
Our decisions since Sears and Compco have made it clear that the
Patent and Copyright Clauses do not, by their own force or by
negative implication, deprive the States of the power to adopt
rules for the promotion of intellectual creation within their own

31
32
33
34

Id. at 579 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8).
416 U.S. 470 (1974).
489 U.S. 141 (1989).
Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 479.

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol24/iss2/3

8

Sandeen: The Myth of Uniformity in IP Laws

2017]

THE MYTH OF UNIFORMITY IN IP LAW

285

jurisdictions. . . . Thus, where “Congress determines that neither
federal protection nor freedom from restraint is required by the
national interest,” the States remain free to promote originality
and creativity in their own domains.35
The difference in Bonito Boats was that Florida’s statute was found to conflict
with U.S. patent law in ways that Ohio’s trade secret law did not, principally
because the Florida statute operated to protect ideas disclosed to the public.36
A desire for uniformity in the application of federal law had little bearing on the
Court’s decision.
More recently, the Supreme Court confronted the federal uniformity
argument in POM Wonderful, LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., a case involving an asserted
conflict between two federal laws: the false advertising provisions of the federal
Lanham Act and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).37 CocaCola argued that the FDCA precludes application of the Lanham Act with
respect to food and beverage labeling because of Congress’s desire to achieve
federal uniformity. Citing Bonito Boats, among other cases, the Court rejected
Coca-Cola’s uniformity argument, observing that: “Congress not infrequently
permits a certain amount of variability by authorizing a federal cause of action
even in areas of law where national uniformity is important.”38 In other words,
despite frequent congressional protestations in favor of federal uniformity, the
Court recognized that Congress often adopts laws, or provisions of law, that are
inconsistent with that goal. Thus, the Court refused to ignore one federal law in
favor of another, even though the FDCA was adopted with federal uniformity
in mind, finding that the plaintiff’s claim for false advertising under the Lanham
Act was not impliedly precluded by the FDCA.
The significance of the Pom decision on the issue of uniformity is not limited
to the Court’s refusal to find that the FDCA precluded a claim under the
35 Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 165 (citing Aronson v. Quick Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262
(1979); Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552–61 (1973); Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 478–479
(quoting Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 559)). See also Aronson, 440 U.S. at 262 (stating “Commercial
agreements traditionally are the domain of state law. State law is not displaced merely because the
contract relates to intellectual property which may or may not be patentable; . . .”).
36 Bonito Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. at 156 (1989) (“At the heart of Sears and Compco is the conclusion
that the efficient operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in
publicly known, unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions.”). See also Brulotte v. Thys Co.,
379 U.S. 29, 31 (1964) (“But these rights become public property once the 17-year period
expires.” (first citing Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185; and then citing Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118)).
37 POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228, 2233 (2014).
38 Id. at 2240.
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Lanham Act, but extends to the Court’s recognition that a lack of uniformity
often results from the fact-specific nature of a federal claim. Distinguishing
between a lack of uniformity on the face of a federal statute, and that which is
caused by the fact specific nature of the required inquiry, the Court noted that:
“The variability about which Coca–Cola complains is no different than the
variability that any industry covered by the Lanham Act faces.”39 In other
words, even where the legislative history of a federal law may indicate a
congressional desire for uniformity, the actual language of the statute,
particularly variable and amorphous standards, will naturally lead to a lack of
uniformity in results.
B. FEDERAL COURTS OFTEN APPLY STATE LAW

As the foregoing demonstrates, there are two interrelated consequences of
principles of federalism and the fact that U.S. IP laws do not always preempt,
preclude, or displace overlapping state or federal laws. First, complementary
and overlapping state and federal laws often co-exist.40 More significantly with
respect to the issue of federal uniformity (discussed more fully below), the
existence of complementary or overlapping state law means that there is a body
of law that federal courts can use when interpreting and applying federal law.
In this regard, although it is often assumed that federal courts only apply federal
law in federal question cases, in fact, they also apply state law in a number of
situations, including because: (1) the federal statute expressly incorporates state
law; (2) the language of the federal statute is ambiguous; or (3) there is a gap in
the federal statute caused by a lack of sufficient details or definitions.41 Because
the state law that is applied in such situations is often the law of the forum state,
it is possible for the application of federal law to differ depending upon the
state in which a lawsuit is brought.42
There are several IP cases that illustrate the federal courts’ use of state law to
determine the meaning of a federal statute and fills its gaps, some of which have
resulted in less federal uniformity rather than more. For instance, in De Sylva v.

Id.
See, e.g., Alexander J. Callen, Note, Avoiding Double Recovery: Assessing Liquidated Damages in Private
Wage and Hour Actions Under the Fair Labor Standards Act and the New York Labor Law, 81 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1881, 1919 (2013) (discussing overlapping state and federal laws governing employee wages).
41 See CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 4514–4520 (3d ed.
2016).
42 See text accompanying infra notes 70–82.
39
40
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Ballentine, the Court applied the state law of California to determine the meaning
of “children” under the 1909 Copyright Act.43 Justice Harlan explained:
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but
that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by
state, rather than federal law. This is especially true where a
statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of
domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.44
Importantly on the issue of uniformity, the Court did not adopt California’s
definition of “children” for all purposes, but only for the subject case. The use
of state law is because of the Erie Court’s direction that state law should apply
in such circumstances and the preference of the Supreme Court for the use of
the law of the forum state when filling gaps in a federal statute.45
Application of the preference for the law of the forum state to fill gaps,
while not leading to federal uniformity, should at least result to Erie uniformity.
However, for a variety of reasons, this preference is not always followed when
interpreting a federal statute or filling its gaps. For instance, in the famous
copyright case of Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid,46 the Court applied
the common law as expressed in the Restatement of Agency, rather than the law of
the forum state, to determine the meanings of “employee” and “scope of
employment” as used in the 1976 Copyright Act’s definition of a work made for
hire.47 In so doing, the Court applied a well-established canon of statutory
construction that favors the common law, explaining:
It is . . . well established that “[w]here Congress uses terms that
have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a
court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, that
Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these
terms.” . . . In the past, when Congress has used the term
“employee” without defining it, we have concluded that Congress

351 U.S. 570, 580–82 (1956).
Id. (citing Reconst. Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cty., 328 U.S. 204; Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. United
States, 308 U.S. 343, 351–52).
45 See text accompanying infra notes 70–75, 89.
46 490 U.S. 730, 730 (1989).
47 Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989) (“The Act nowhere
defines the terms ‘employee’ or ‘scope of employment.’ ”).
43
44
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intended to describe the conventional master-servant relationship
as understood by common-law agency doctrine.48
Similarly, in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Court looked to common law
to determine the meaning of the 1976 Copyright Act’s “first sale doctrine,”
explaining: “ ‘[W]hen a statute covers an issue previously governed by the
common law,’ we must presume that ‘Congress intended to retain the substance
of the common law.’ ”49
As decisions of the Supreme Court, the definitions used in Reid and Kirtsaeng
are now the “supreme law of the land,” binding on all federal courts unless
Congress decides to change those definitions.50 Thus, once a case is decided by
the Supreme Court and the meaning of a statutory term is fixed, a federal
uniformity problem only arises when Supreme Court precedent is misapplied.
However, it may take years or decades before the Supreme Court rules on the
meaning of a federal statute and, in the meantime, the lower federal courts may
adopt differing definitions of terms used in federal statutes by applying the law
of the forum state, using some other source of law to fill the gaps, or making its
own law.
Congress can reduce the instances of varying definitions and improve federal
uniformity by exercising more care to define statutory terms. Or, if it does not
want the law of the forum state to apply, it can adopt a specific provision of law
which, in effect, precludes application of the law of the forum state. One such
provision was at issue in Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., involving a circuit
split on the question of whether the equitable defense of laches could apply
within the statute of limitation period specified by the 1976 Copyright Act.51 As
Justice Ginsburg explained, “[u]ntil 1957, federal copyright law did not include a
statute of limitations for civil suits. Federal courts therefore used analogous state
statutes of limitations to determine the timeliness of infringement claims.”52 With
the adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act, however, Congress decided that federal
uniformity on the issue was important and that a three-year statute of limitations
would apply.53 Thus, the Court ruled that “in face of a statute of limitations
enacted by Congress, laches cannot be invoked to bar legal relief.”54 In so doing,
48 Id. at 739–40 (citing NLRB v. Amax Coal Co., 453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981); and then citing
Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)).
49 568 U.S. 519, 538.
50 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
51 134 S. Ct. 1962, 1982 (2014).
52 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1968 (citing S. REP. NO. 1014, at 2 (1957)).
53 Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. 507(b) (1976).
54 Petrella, 134 S. Ct. at 1974.
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it explicitly distinguished between the use of state law to fill gaps (which is
allowed) and the use of state law to override Congressional intent as expressed in
the language of a statute (which is not allowed).55
III. CATEGORIZING THE UNIFORMITY PROBLEMS
As the foregoing illustrations of uniformity issues in IP cases suggests, there
are number of possible reasons for a lack of uniformity in the interpretation and
application of federal law. As further discussed in Part IV, some of these
problems might be avoided by better legislative and drafting processes, but
some of them are inherent in our system of federalism and are largely
unavoidable. As noted by Justice Scalia in O’Melveny & Meyers, if the federal
courts accepted the uniformity argument in every case they would “be awash in
federal common law rules.”56 More importantly, a lack of uniformity may be
desirable in some cases, particularly if the asserted ideal of federal uniformity
conflicts with community norms and other important interests. In the
following subsections, the principal reasons why the interpretation and
application of federal law is not always uniform are explained in greater detail.
A. THE INTERPRETATION PROBLEM

In the same way that the complexity of language often prevents patent
attorneys from writing perfect patent claims,57 often it prevents Congress from
writing a perfect federal law. But the process of statutory drafting is made even
worse by the horse-trading nature and practical realities of the political process.
The fact is that legislation is largely written by lobbyists or congressional staff
and neither appear to care much about how rules of statutory interpretation will
affect the application of the laws they draft.58 Sometimes the incompleteness of
a statute is intentional due to an inability to get the law passed otherwise,
thereby impliedly authorizing federal courts to fill gaps. Also, as a result of
these dynamics, federal statutes are often incomplete or riddled with ambiguity.
Where gaps and ambiguity exist, federal courts do not have the “plain meaning”
55 Id. (stating “[t]he expansive role for laches MGM envisions careens away from understandings,
past and present, of the essentially gap-filling, not legislation-overriding, office of laches”).
56 O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 114 S. Ct. 2048, 2048 (1994).
57 KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
58 See Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) (presenting
the results of the largest empirical study to date of congressional staff statutory drafting practices and
knowledge of the rules of statutory interpretation); Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics
of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575 (2002).
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of a statute to rely upon and can look to other sources for meaning, resulting in
potentially different interpretations of the same federal laws by different federal
courts.
There are a number of rules of statutory interpretation which, in theory,
should lead to more uniform results among federal courts that interpret the
same provision of federal law, but the rules and the specific context in which
they are applied give courts discretion concerning which rules to apply.59
Moreover, there is debate about the sources of information that federal courts
can use when interpreting statutes, particularly with respect to legal maxims60
and legislative history.61 Thus, to understand the interpretation problem, and
why it cannot be easily fixed to enhance the uniformity of federal law, requires
an understanding of both the sources of information and the hierarchy of
information that are typically used to interpret a statute.
The process of statutory interpretation usually begins with application of the
most important canon of construction: a statute shall be interpreted in
accordance with its plain meaning.62 This often includes statutory definitions,
but even statutes with a lot of definitions, like the 1976 Copyright Act,
frequently fail to define key terms.63 Because statutes are not always the picture
of clarity, courts often look to extrinsic sources of information for guidance. In
general order of preference, this includes: (1) a dictionary; (2) the entirety of the
statute and the context within the statute of the language at issue; (3) canons of
construction; and (4) legislative history.64 Where an administrative agency is
involved in applying the law, as is the case with U.S. patent, trademark, and

59 See Paul J. Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of
National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 812–14 (1957).
60 See, e.g., Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1179.
61 See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 845, 874 (1992).
62 Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S. 153, 164 (1985).
63 See, e.g., Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (involving the
failure of Congress to define the terms “employee” and “course and scope of employment”).
64 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 61 (2012) (textual approach; “[t]he canons influence not just how courts approach
texts but also the techniques that legal drafters follow in preparing those texts”); see also Chisom v.
Edwards, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2369 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissent affirming textualism and correct order in
statutory interpretation). Compare with McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 909 (2010)
(Stevens, J. dissent that “[i]t is not the role of federal judges to be amateur historians. And it is
not fidelity to the Constitution to ignore its use of deliberately capacious language, in an effort to
transform foundational legal commitments into narrow rules of decision.”).
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copyright law, federal courts will also examine the interpretations of words and
terms used by the relevant agency.65
Because rules of statutory interpretation are largely guideposts, and not
immutable rules, federal courts have discretion to utilize them or not.66 For
instance, discretion is exercised by individual judges in deciding: which
dictionary to consult; which definition within a dictionary to use;67 how to
define the statutory context; whether to look at other federal laws; which
canons of construction to use; whether to consult legislative history, and, if so,
what legislative history to use. It is no wonder, then, that lower federal courts
often have divergent views about the meaning of the same statute.
The interpretation of a statute is also necessarily determined by the facts of a
case and the quality of the information and arguments that are presented to the
court, with the budgets of litigants and the workload of the lower federal courts
not always allowing for an in-depth examination of all issues. Some trial court
judges will not consider an issue unless it is presented by the lawyers, and thus
will not consider an interpretation issue sua sponte. There is also the practical
problem that the ambiguity of a statute, or the need for a specialized meaning,
may not reveal itself until it becomes clear that the trier of fact applied it in a
particular way. This then leads to the issues on appeal being presented to
different courts, in different ways, by different litigants, and based upon
different records.
Further undermining the ability of federal laws to reflect unified “federal”
principles of law are several canons of construction that encourage federal
courts to look to principles of state law to interpret federal statutes and fill gaps.
The first and foremost is the Erie doctrine, which, as discussed, directs federal
courts to look to the law of the forum state, not only in diversity cases, but
when filling gaps in a federal statute. There is also the “borrowed statute rule”
which provides that when Congress borrows a statute from another source
(state or federal), it also implicitly adopts prior interpretations placed on that
statute, absent an express statement to the contrary.68 As discussed, another
65 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 213 (1954) (“So we have a contemporaneous and long
continued construction of the statutes by the agency charged to administer them that would allow
the registration of such a statuette as is in question here.”).
66 See Sebelius v. Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 817, 819–20 (2013) (noting that an
“interpretive guide, like other canons of construction, is ‘no more than [a] rul[e] of thumb, that
can tip the scales when a statute could be read in multiple ways”), quoting Connecticut Nat. Bank
v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992).
67 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519, 530–31 (2013) (noting the difficulty
of deciding which definition of “under” to use).
68 See Molzof v. United States, 502 U.S. 301, 308 (1992) (adopting several states’ definition of
“punitive damages”); Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65–66 (1987) (holding that,
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canon of statutory construction provides that “ ‘when a statute covers an issue
previously governed by the common law,’ it is presumed that ‘Congress
intended to retain the substance of the common law.’ ”69 As a result of these
and other canons of construction, it is not only possible that the interpretation
of federal statutes will differ depending upon the state in which a court sits, but
it is highly likely.
B. THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND INTERSTITIAL LAWMAKING

While reasonable courts can always differ on the interpretation of federal
law, another reason why federal uniformity is more myth than reality is because
of the principles of federalism upon which the United States was founded,
particularly as those principles are expressed in the Erie doctrine.70 Because Erie
was a federal case brought pursuant to the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction,
many assume that the Erie doctrine (which generally requires the application of
state substantive law in federal cases) is only applicable in diversity cases. This
is not true; the doctrine also applies in federal question cases when federal
courts are required to fill gaps in federal statutes and engage in interstitial
lawmaking.71 Moreover, for purposes of the present discussion, people seem to
forget that the Erie decision, itself, was based upon concerns about uniformity,
including fears of forum shopping.72 However, the concern was not one of
federal uniformity. The Supreme Court directed that state law should apply
where federal law was silent because it did not want a potentially non-uniform
body of federal common law to be developed and used in competition with
state law.73 This explains why there is a preference that the law of the forum
state be used to fill gaps in a federal statute and why there is no “general federal
common law.” But it also sets up the probability that anytime a federal statute
co-exists with state law, forum shopping between state and federal courts or
because ERISA contained nearly identical language to the LMRA, ERISA must be interpreted in
accord with the LMRA).
69 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 183 (1989) (“Although we must do so
when Congress plainly directs, as a rule we should be and are reluctant to ‘federalize matters
traditionally covered by state common law.’ ”). See also Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568
U.S. 519, 538 (relying upon the common law “first sale doctrine” to interpret language in the
1976 Copyright Act), quoting Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305 (2010).
70 See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 64 (1938).
71 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41.
72 Erie, 304 U.S. at 71. See also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (quoting Lewis v.
Mfrs. Nat’l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961) (“Uniform treatment of property interests by both state
and federal courts within a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to
prevent a party from receiving ‘a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy.’ ”)
73 See generally Erie, 304 U.S. 64.
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between federal circuits will occur as litigants look for the most favorable
interpretation of the federal law.
Where a federal statute directly and clearly addresses an issue, the federal law
applies, but sometimes a federal statute is missing words and definitions or
includes poor and ambiguous word choices. In such situations, courts
interpreting and applying the federal statute face two choices. First, they can
decide that Congress did not intend the gaps to be filled at all, let alone with
state law. This was the result in a series of cases involving federal patent,
copyright, and trademark law where the litigants unsuccessfully tried to
convince the courts to recognize a right of contribution where none was
specified in the federal statutes.74 Second, federal courts can decide that they
have the power to fill the gaps.
Under the second choice, federal courts must decide what law to use to fill
the gaps, with the principles of Erie strongly suggesting that they should use the
law of the forum state. A natural result of applying the law of the forum state is
a lack of uniformity whenever the applicable law varies from state to state.
Moreover, this is not the type of circuit split that the U.S. Supreme Court can
“resolve” unless it determines that one of the limited exceptions to the
preference for application of the law of the forum state applies.75 While the
jurisprudence in this area is complicated, three principal reasons for ignoring
the law of the forum state have been identified: (1) where there is “significant
conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use of state law”;76 (2)
where “the policy of the law is so dominated by the sweep of federal statutes
that legal restrictions they affect must be deemed governed by federal law”;77
and (3) where there is a “strong national or federal concern originating from the
Constitution, from tradition . . . or from practical necessity,” including the need
for federal uniformity.78
When federal courts determine that they can ignore the law of the forum
state, they have broad discretion to decide which other sources of law to utilize,
which might include: the law of a different state; state law as expressed in the
Restatement of Laws; or uniform laws.79 Thus, even when federal courts decide to
74 See, e.g., Chemtron, Inc. v. Aqua Prods., Inc., 830 F. Supp. 314, 316 (E.D. Va. 1993) (patent);
Lehman Bros. v. Wu, 294 F. Supp. 2d 504 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (copyright); Getty Petroleum Corp. v.
Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1988) (trademark).
75 Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Klaxon Co., 125 F.2d 820, 823–24 (1942).
76 See 19 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 41, § 4514 (quoting Empire Healthchoice Assur. Inc. v.
McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 679 (2006)).
77 Id. (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Elec. Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
78 Id.
79 Id. at 824.
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“make federal common law,” the process they use can still lead to a lack of
federal uniformity that will not be resolved until the U.S. Supreme Court hears
the issue and decides for itself the source of law to use or Congress amends the
statute to clarify the issue.
When federal courts decide to apply state law, the potential lack of
uniformity is heightened by the fact that federal judges often must guess what
the state law would be in a certain circumstance, sometimes getting it wrong.
This can happen, for instance, where no state court (and particularly the highest
court of a state) has ruled on the subject issue of state law, resulting in a lack of
clarity about what is “the law of the forum state.” As the Supreme Court
explained in Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., “the proper function of
the . . . federal court is to ascertain what the state law is, not what it ought to
be.”80 Sometimes this can be difficult, as the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
found out in Edwards v. Arthur Andersen, LLP.81 In that case, the California
Supreme Court refused to apply the “narrow-restraint” exception to California’s
noncompete law, thereby rejecting the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ guess
about the substance and meaning of California law.82
C. THE LIMITS OF FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND DSPLACEMENT

Congress can avoid any Erie problems that lead to a lack of federal
uniformity by enacting federal laws with preemption or displacement clauses or
by more fully specifying the details of federal law, but Congress often fails to do
so, even in cases where it is adopting legislation pursuant to a Constitutional
provision which gives it broad powers, such as the Intellectual Property
Clause.83 Section 301 of the 1976 Copyright Act provides an example of
legislatively imposed limits on federal preemption. Congress might have
exercised its power to preempt all state laws for the protection of creative
works and information, but instead chose to limit the preemption of state laws
so as not to include “activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as
specified by section 106.”84 Similarly, the DTSA, specifically states that it does

313 U.S. 487, 497 (1941).
189 P.3d 285, 288–89 (Cal. 2008).
82 Id. at 293.
83 Margaret H. Lemos, Interpretative Methodology and Definitions to Courts: Are “Common Law
Statutes” Different?, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW, supra note 23 (noting
that “explicit delegations of substantive lawmaking power to courts are rare” and giving the
Federal Rules of Evidence as one example).
84 17 U.S.C. § 301(b)(3) (1990).
80
81
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not preempt or displace the application of state law.85 This not only means that
state trade secret law will continue to exist but that, when filling gaps in the
DTSA, a showing of an intent to preclude application of state law cannot be
made, except possibly with respect to the “new” provisions of the DTSA.86
The principal reason that Congress does not routinely preempt or displace
state law is because of our system of federalism and Congress’s preference that
state law should apply to fill gaps in federal law.87 In the absence of an express
preemption clause, the preemption jurisprudence of the Supreme Court makes
it very difficult to infer preemption. In fact, some courts apply a “presumption
against preemption” that can only be overcome by a clear showing of either
conflict or field preemption.88 As illustrated by the cases summarized in Part I,
it is possible for state law to be deemed preempted by federal patent laws, but it
is just as likely that it will not be. As the Court in Bonito Boats explained: “The
case for federal pre-emption is particularly weak where Congress has indicated
its awareness of the operation of state law in a field of federal interest, and has
nonetheless decided to ‘stand by both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension
there [is] between them.’ ”89 The case for federal preemption is also weak
where the public policy of the state is particularly strong. As explained in
Kiwanis International v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, a case involving a conflict between
federal trademark law and state anti-discrimination laws: “In sum, it would do
violence to the delicate balance of power struck by the supremacy clause to
hold that the tangential federal interest in trademark uniformity preempts the
principled state interest in eliminating discrimination which is at issue here.”90
Even where conflict preemption is possible, because application of the
doctrine depends upon the specifics of the subject state law, it is possible that
85 See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I), (II). This is an example of what Abbe R. Gluck has
labeled “national federalism,” “statutory federalism” and “intrastatutory federalism.” In this case,
a federal statute, instead of preempting or precluding state law, expressly directs the federal courts
to consider state law. See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996,
1997 (2014).
86 See Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward A Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret
Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (2018).
87 LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: GENERAL
PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 20–21 (2011).
88 Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 27 (1982) (upholding “normal presumption”); Crosby v. Nat’l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (categorizing the types of preemption.); Pac. Gas
& Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983).
See also Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the
Roberts Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253.
89 Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 166–67 (1989) (quoting
Silkwood v. Kerr–McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)). See also FROMER, supra note 23.
90 627 F. Supp. 1381, 1392 (D.N.J. 1986).
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one state’s version of a law will be preempted, but another state’s version of a
similar law will not be.91 This may look like a lack of uniformity in the
application of the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence, but in reality it is
a result of the fact-specific nature of the implied preemption analysis. For
purposes of the federal uniformity argument, the import of the failure of many
federal laws to preempt state law is that the state law continues to coexist with
the subject federal law and can be used as a source of law for purposes of both
statutory interpretation and interstitial lawmaking. Also, due to the possible
application of the forum state’s law governing choice of law, it is possible that
state law that is different from the state where the federal court hearing the case
sits may apply, heightening possible errors related to that court’s understanding
of the applicable state law.
Even when a federal law does not preempt state law, either expressly or
implicitly, Congress can nonetheless decide to preclude application of the
forum state law to fill gaps in a federal statute by indicating its intent to
“displace” state law. However, while it has such power, due to principles of
federalism, adherence to “State’s rights,” political obstacles, or simple
inadvertence, it doesn’t always exercise this power.92 One practical reason is
that Congress does not always have time to carefully consider how a decision to
preclude application of state law would affect individuals and businesses in each
state. This also illustrates the problems that can result when Congress decides
to legislate in an area traditionally left to the states, as it did in the case of the
DTSA. A federal statute, whether preempting state law or not, is bound to
upset established relationships and business practices because the existence of
the federal law creates the environment for forum shopping and can lead to the
development of different legal principles.

91 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526 (1977) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941) (stating “[o]ur task is ‘to determine whether, under the circumstances of this
particular case, [the State’s] law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
full purposes and objectives of Congress’ ”)).
92 See, e.g., Adams v. United States of America, 2006 WL 3309873 (U.S.), at *7 (stating Congress
“expressly negated any possible inference that federal courts were to exercise any ‘common
lawmaking’ power to fashion torts under the Act in the interest of national uniformity.” In fact,
Congress designed the FTCA to tolerate “a great deal of variation from state to state in whether
behavior will be considered tortious.”), internal citations omitted. See also N. Star Steel Co. v.
Thomas, 515 U.S. 29, 34 (1995) (analyzing congressional practice of allowing states to fill in
limitation gaps).
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D. APPLICATION PROBLEMS

Another reason for the lack of uniformity in federal laws is due to the factdependent nature of many of the issues. This is particularly true when a federal
statute requires application of a flexible standard or community norms, as is
often the case with federal IP laws. For instance, the “reasonable efforts”
requirement of trade secret law, the “likelihood of confusion” analysis of
trademark law, and the “fair use” standard of copyright law.93 This is why,
when people assail the lack of uniformity in a particular area of law (as they did
in the lead-up to the DTSA with respect to trade secret law under the Uniform
Trade Secret Act), care must be taken to determine if that lack of uniformity is
due to a difference in statutory language or a difference in application of the law
to the particular facts of the case. Only the first problem has any chance of
being solved through legislation, and even then, not perfectly due to the other
uniformity problems noted herein.
Certain issues in law are more suitable for a rule than a standard,94 like
stating a rule that the patent term is for twenty years after the filing of a patent
application. But even then, the result is not perfectly predictable because the
rule often includes qualifiers or exceptions, like the definition of “effective filing
date” and the possibility of patent term extensions. On the other side of the
spectrum, some issues in law have a low degree of predictability because the
outcome is highly fact-dependent or because they require application of
community norms. It is with respect to such issues that standards, rather than
rules, are more common and when uniformity is most difficult to achieve.
Thus, rather than just arguing for uniformity for uniformity sake, we should
identify the issues upon which uniformity is key and, as importantly, determine
whether it is realistic to believe uniformity can be achieved.
E. CONFLICTS WITH OTHER FEDERAL LAWS OR THE CONSTITUTION

The potential for conflicts between multiple federal laws or between a
federal law and a provision of the Constitution presents another circumstance
where seemingly non-uniform application of federal law may result.95 Although
93 Lemos, supra note 83 (stating a “reasonableness standard plainly invites judicial
policymaking. The standard requires further elaboration to clarify its contents, and even the
courts most committed textualists recognize that the text of the statute plays a minimal role in
that process” (citing Daniel A. Farber & Brett H. McDonnell, “Is There a Text in this Class?” The
Conflict Between Textualism and Antitrust, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 619, 621 (2005))).
94 See Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379 (1985) (defining rules and
standards and explaining the pros and cons of each).
95 See supra notes 37–39 and accompanying text.
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the general rule with respect to conflicting federal statutes is that the courts are
not to prefer one over the other,96 sometimes a determination of Congressional
preference will be found.97 Where provisions of the U.S. Constitution create
the conflict, there are two possible scenarios. First, a federal statute may be
ruled unconstitutional on its face, in which case a measure of uniformity exists
because the statute is either constitutional or not. Such was the case in the
Trademark Cases, where the applicable federal statute was held unconstitutional
because Congress did not have the power pursuant to the Intellectual Property
Clause of the Constitution to enact a federal trademark law.98 Conflicts and a
resulting lack of uniformity are more likely in the second scenario where a
federal statute may be constitutional on its face, but is unconstitutional as
applied. For instance, in intellectual property cases, the plaintiff might be
entitled to an injunction in most cases, but in some cases an injunction would
restrict free speech or violate some other Constitutional right.99 Then, the
interest in federal uniformity is overridden in favor of a higher valued
Constitutional right.
F. PROCEDURAL ISSUES

One area of federal law that is more uniform than others is the law
governing federal civil procedure because the Erie doctrine does not generally
apply, at least to the extent that there is a properly adopted Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure on the issue in question.100 Where a federal rule of civil procedure
does not exist on a given point, the analysis can get more complicated as federal
courts will often apply state laws that while seemingly “procedural” would
“significantly affect” the results of a case, thereby being deemed

96 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181 (1989) (quoting Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 461 (1975) (stating “where the statutes do in fact overlap we are
not at liberty ‘to infer any positive preference for one over the other’ ”)). But see GARRETT EPPS,
AMERICAN EPIC. READING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 85 (2013) (explaining that a statute
preferring one state over another, while not Constitutional, “is not necessarily rendered invalid”).
97 Richard Steven Rosenberg, Boys Markets Injunctive Relief in the Sympathy Strike Context: Buffalo
Forge from a Management Perspective, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 665, 677, n.55 (1977) (stating “[t]he
driving force behind Boys Markets was to implement the strong Congressional preference” (citing
Boys Markets Inc. v. Retail Clerk’s Union, 398 U.S. 235, 245 (1970))).
98 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96–97 (1879).
99 See, e.g., Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 935 (1996) (explaining Communications Decency
Act section, 47 U.S.C.S. § 223(d), “has a chilling effect on free expression”). See generally Reno v.
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
100 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
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“substantive.”101 Thus, a lack of federal uniformity can result from divergent
interpretations of applicable rules of federal procedure or because the
procedural issue is deemed to be an issue upon which state law must apply.
IV. REFLECTIONS ON THE VALUE OF UNIFORMITY IN IP LAW
In her article, Overvaluing Uniformity, Professor Amanda Frost raised the
salient question whether uniformity is a worthy goal and, if so, for what
reasons.102 The same question can be asked with respect to federal IP laws,
particularly when Congress decides to intrude upon an area of law that has
traditionally been left to the states, as it did with the Lanham Act and the recent
enactment of the DTSA.
According to Professor Frost, a number of arguments in favor of federal
uniformity have been asserted over the years, including: (1) the need for federal
court legitimacy; (2) a desire to improve the plight of multi-state actors; (3) the
benefits of predictability; and (4) the avoidance of forum shopping.103 The
legislative history of the DTSA reveals that the second and third rationales were
principal justifications for its enactment, but it was also argued that a federal
civil cause of action for trade secret misappropriation was needed to place trade
secrets on par with the existing federal intellectual property laws in the areas of
patent, copyright, and trademark. The thought was that, particularly in
international circles, U.S. trade secret law would not be respected unless it was
part of federal law.104
All the foregoing rationales for federal uniformity seem good on paper, but
as noted previously, for a variety of legal and practical reasons, federal
uniformity is difficult to achieve even when a detailed federal law is written.
Moreover, the perceived legitimacy of federal law over state law could easily be
applied to a wide variety of state laws, such as commercial law, but no one is
clamoring to supplant the Uniform Commercial Code with a federal law. In
fact, if anything, our system of federalism establishes both a Constitutional and

101 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 110 (1945) (“As to consequences that so intimately
affect recovery or non-recovery a federal court in a diversity case should follow State law.”).
102 Frost, supra note 9, at 1581 (stating “[t]o be clear, the claim here is not that uniformity is
worthless or that inconsistent interpretation of federal law is never problematic, but rather that
eradicating nonuniformity has too often been given priority at the expense of other values”).
103 Id. at 1569.
104 See R. Mark Halligan, Revisited 2015: Protection of U.S. Trade Secret Assets: Critical Amendments to
the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 14 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 476, 483–85 (2015);
David S. Ameling, Four Reasons to Enact a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 769, 782–86 (2009).
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institutional preference for the application of state substantive law over federal
substantive law.
While policymakers and lobbyists are apt to trot out the rhetoric of
uniformity whenever they wish to enact a new federal law, because the desired
uniformity does not always result, it is important to focus on other possible
rationales for new federal laws. One such rationale is that a federal law is
needed to fill a gap that exists in state law, for instance the legal vacuum that
was created in unfair competition law following the Supreme Court’s decision
in Erie.105 However, in such cases, the gap might also be filled by a uniform
state law, as was the case with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,106 again raising
the important question why a federal law would be better.
Sometimes a new federal law is justified by changes in technology that
require a response that is quicker than either the common law or the drafting
and adoption of a uniform law can provide. Both the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act107 and the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act108 are examples of
this approach, but they also reveal that a rush to enact federal legislation can
result in legislation being enacted before all the problems are known. Related to
this rationale is the fact that a federal statute (or a uniform state law) can often
be used to speed-up or fix the development of common law in a certain area, as
was the case with the Uniform Trade Secrets Act.109
Most arguments in favor of federal uniformity focus on the asserted benefits
of uniformity but fail to explore the reasons why Congress does not act to
further uniformity in all areas of law. This underscores the weakness of the
uniformity argument because it shows that there is no general interest in the
uniformity of legal principles, only an interest in federal uniformity with respect
to those areas of law over which Congress wishes to assert control. Whether
explained as respect for states’ rights or an inability to get legislation passed, the
simple fact is that the benefits of federal uniformity are often not enough to
motivate the enactment of a federal law, even when there are numerous
conflicting state laws on the subject. Privacy laws governing the protection of
personally identifiable information and rights of publicity laws provide two IP-

See Mark P. McKenna, Trademark Law’s Faux Federalism, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
supra note 23.
106 See Sharon K. Sandeen, The Evolution of Trade Secret Law and Why Courts Commit Error When
They Do Not Follow the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 493, 507 (2010) (describing
the Erie/Sears/Compco squeeze).
107 Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998).
108 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (1986).
109 See Sandeen, supra note 106, at 493.
105
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related examples of laws that have been left to the states despite the benefits of
federal uniformity.
Although the European Union has embraced the value of uniformity to
adopt comprehensive privacy and data protection laws,110 comparable laws in
the United States are a hodge-podge of federal statutes, state statutes, and
common law,111 leading both to an absence of robust protection (except in
some specialized areas like healthcare) and inefficiencies that come from
businesses having to comply with inconsistent state laws. Apparently, with
respect to privacy, the usual desire for federal uniformity is overridden by
industry fears that a federal privacy law might require them to do too much.
With respect to rights of publicity, numerous states have adopted inconsistent
laws that have spawned much confusion and litigation and have created rights
that often conflict with copyrights.112 Although these state laws can be a drag
on the creation and distribution of creative works, Congress apparently does
not care enough about federal uniformity to resolve the morass of legal issues
that have resulted from inconsistent rights of publicity laws.
V. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
On the surface, the goal of uniformity in law seems commendable, but we
must be clear about whether we want “Erie uniformity,” “federal uniformity,”
or the “national uniformity” that results from widely-adopted uniform state
laws. Because federal uniformity is more myth than reality, the federal
uniformity argument should be seen for what it is: more of a rhetorical device
than an achievable goal. When Congress is truly concerned about federal
uniformity (as opposed to Erie uniformity), there are steps it can take to
increase the likelihood of actual uniformity. But these steps present their own
problems, not the least of which is the ability to effectuate them.
110 See, e.g., Directive 95/46/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of Oct. 24
1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the
Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31-50 (centerpiece of current proposal for
Commission Regulation 2012/0011, 2012 O.J. (L 8) 1-22); Directive 2002/58/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 12 July 2002 Concerning the Processing of Personal
Data and the Protection of Privacy in the Electronic Communications Sector (Directive on
Privacy and Electronic Communications), 2002 O.J. (L 201) 37-47.
111 See, e.g., Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d
(2016) (protection for individual’s health data); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of
2003, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601, 1681 (2016); Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, 15
U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506 (2016).
112 Jennifer E. Rothman, Liberating Copyright: Thinking Beyond Free Speech, 95 CORNELL L. REV.
463, 479 (2010).
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First, Congress can always increase uniformity by drafting federal laws with
more details, including more rules than standards and appropriate and clear
definitions. When it does so, the federal courts are required by canons of
statutory construction to apply the federal law without resort to other resources,
like the law of the forum state. But as the Copyright Act of 1976 reveals, even
the most comprehensive of federal laws are likely to have ambiguities and gaps
that must be resolved and filled, and bright-line rules are not always possible.
Thus, the more fundamental issue is whether Congress should provide the details
or defer to the federal courts to do so, in essence, allowing them to become
laboratories for better lawmaking overtime and in context.113 In making such a
choice, as it arguably did with many aspects of federal IP law, at some point
Congress should either clean-up the mess that its poor legislative drafting caused
or accept the lack of federal uniformity it created. Otherwise, without legislative
fixes, it is litigants and the courts that are burdened with the ill-effects of a lack of
federal uniformity. Another alternative is not to legislate in the area at all, leaving
it up to the states to adopt laws, including uniform state laws, as they see fit.
Second, when adopting a new federal law, Congress can avoid express or
implied incorporation of state law and explicitly preempt or displace state law,
thereby sanctioning federal courts to make “federal common law” to fill gaps
rather than defaulting to the law of the forum state or other principles of state
law. The problem with this approach is that non-uniformity may still result
until the Supreme Court is heard on an issue. Moreover, it is an approach that
is contrary to principles of federalism and concerns about judicial activism. It
also increases the possibility that federal law will change longstanding principles
of state law, such as those that governed trade secret law before the DTSA was
adopted. Without careful study and great care, such an approach can
fundamentally alter the settled expectations of the parties, particularly with
respect to property and familial rights and other obligations that have typically
been left to the states to define. This was a concern about the DTSA with
respect to the laws of the individual states on restraints of trade until a
provision was added to require federal courts to take such laws into account.114
Third, and consistent with the Erie doctrine, Congress can be more resistant
to legislating in areas traditionally governed by common law. There are areas of
law, like U.S. commercial law and trade secret law, where other uniformityenhancing mechanisms have already operated to create a largely uniform body
See Hills, supra note 21, at 1.
S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 8 (2016) (stating “some members, including Senator Feinstein,
voiced concern that the injunctive relief authorized under the bill could override state-law
limitations that safeguard employee mobility and thus could be a substantial departure from
existing law in those states”).
113
114
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of law.115 When federal law is adopted with respect to such areas of law, it
threatens to do more harm than good by creating the possibility that nonuniform principles of state and federal law will develop and litigants will forum
shop between state and federal courts. On the other hand, there are some other
areas of law, like trademark law116 and rights of publicity law, where federal
intervention can create uniformity where little exists at the time the federal law
is enacted. In other words, congressional legislative efforts should focus on
determining if and how a federal law can improve the existing legal landscape
by either filling gaps in existing law or speeding up a common law-making
process that has led to a lack of clarity and predictability.
VI. CONCLUSION
While uniformity in IP laws is a laudable goal, one must be realistic about
the degree of uniformity that can be achieved through the adoption of federal
laws, or even uniform state laws. Setting forth uniform rules and standards is
one thing, being able to ensure particular results on fact-specific issues is quite
another. This is particularly true when federal courts are called upon to apply
such amorphous concepts as “novelty,” “nonobviousness,” “originality,” “fair
use,” “likelihood of confusion,” and “reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy.”117
In theory, efforts to make the law “clearer” are always a good idea, but those
efforts can also backfire because too much specificity and clarity often narrow
the scope of rights. It is the classic Goldilocks problem; it is difficult to get
lawmaking “just right.” Someone will always lose that hoped to win. If they
lose, they might lobby Congress to change the law, but then someone else who
hoped to win will lose, and if they have a powerful enough lobby, the cycle will
continue. Seen in this light, there is something comforting about a lack of
uniformity because it allows issues to exist and evolve outside of the political
sphere where they can be argued based upon the facts and equities of the
situation. And, in keeping with principles of federalism, often the states are in a
much better position than Congress to make laws uniform.

115 Carlyle Conwell Ring, Jr., A New Era: Cooperative Federalism—Through the Uniform State Laws
Process, 33 HAMLINE L. REV. 375, 377–78 (2010).
116 McKenna, supra note 105 (explaining the development of federal principles of trademark law
in the aftermath of Erie and the adoption soon thereafter of the federal Lanham Act).
117 See text accompanying supra note 93.
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